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The controversy over domain names is merely part of a larger
picture in which trademark and unfair competition law will govern
cyberspace. I foresee two factors driving the continued escalation
of trademark disputes in cyberspace. First, cyberspace provides
millions of people with a low cost way to become an instant
publisher of an on-line magazine with a potential global audience.
For decades it has seemed like every possible splinter religious
group, offbeat political viewpoint, movie star fan club and
collector's association has had a newsletter or fanzine. Now, each
individual within every splinter group can have his or her own web
page, putting out a message with eye-catching graphics on
computer screens around the world. Each of the millions of web
pages is a potential source of trademark infringement. Secondly,
trademark disputes will continue to escalate as cyberspace emerges
as the new global medium for both advertising and selling every
kind of goods or services imaginable. It is predicted that
traditional businesses from travel agents to stock brokers to music
CD distribution will all be changed beyond recognition by the
advent of cyberspace.
From the legal perspective, two things will happen. First,
trademark infringement in commercially oriented cyberspace will
increase. Second, the number of on-line trademarks and web site
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. Author of
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th ed. 1999); The Rights of
Publicity and Privacy (1987 & Suppl.); and McCarthy's Desk Encyclopedia of
Intellectual Property (2d ed. 1995).
This article is based on the Niro Lecture given by the author at the DePaul
College of Law on September 15, 1999.
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trade dresses which are "cyber-protectable" will also increase.
More trade means more trademarks. With more trademarks comes
correspondingly more trademark registrations and more trademark
disputes. Depending on one's perspective, this will be viewed as
either a growth plan for the trademark bar or a drag on the
development of e-commerce. In any event, I see it as inevitable.
II. METATAGS, KEYWORDS AND BANNER ADVERTISING
The Internet has presented two new kinds of possible trademark
infringement: 1) metatags and 2) the selling by search engines of
key words for banner advertising.
A. Metatags
Several synonyms exist for metatags. Sometimes they are called
"hidden code," "buried code," or "html code."1 A "metatag" is a
list of words normally hidden in a web site that acts as an index or
reference source identifying the content of the web site for search
engines. This has been analogized to the subject index of a library
card catalog, indicating the general subject of a book.2 For
example, a web site on the life of Winston Churchill might have
metatags such as "British Parliament," "English history," "World
War II," "Nobel prizes," etc. "Cyber-stuffing," is somewhat
different, as will be explained later.
1 See Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, n. 23 (9th Cir. 1999) (using the term "metatags" as encompassing all
these terms).
2 Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Welles, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1186 (S.D. Cal. 1998),
aff'd without opinion, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Much like the subject
index of a card catalog, the metatags give the websurfer using a search engine a
clearer indication of the content of a web-site."); I.S. Nathenson, Internet
Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12
HARv. JOUR. L. & TECHNOLOGY 44, 47 (1998) ("By themselves, metatags
represent a modem variant on long-utilized systems of keyword indexing, such
as those used by libraries in their card catalogs.")
[Vol. X:231232
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TRADEMARKS AND DOMAIN NAMES
When one searches the World Wide Web or Internet for
something of interest, several competing search engines3 are
available. Most readers are probably familiar with entities such as
Excite, Yahoo, Lycos, Alta-Vista and Goto. These search engines
are very fast but very literal. Imagine that Mrs. Smith in Oak
Brook, Illinois types a word, like "Disney" in the Excite search
engine because she is taking her children to visit San Francisco and
is looking for the web page of the Walt Disney Company. She
wants to find out where the Disney retail store in San Francisco is
located. The search engine then reads some web sites and counts
the number of times it sees the word "Disney," giving special
weight to the supposedly descriptive metatags. The search engine
then lists what it found, with the number one choice being the site
that had the most mentions of the word "Disney," the second
choice being the site with the second most mentions of "Disney"
and so on.4
Mrs. Smith clicks on the link to the number one choice and she
suddenly finds herself in the web site of a religious group that is
boycotting Disney because it thinks that Disney movies and its
employment practices are immoral. Or perhaps she clicks on the
number two choice and finds herself in the web site of a small
animation studio located in Bombay, India that tells her that it can
fulfill her commercial animation needs at one tenth the cost of
Disney animators. Or perhaps she finds herself at the web site of a
person who says he will sell "genuine" collectors' quality Disney
animation cells at 50% off.
Mrs. Smith asks herself: "How did I get diverted from where I
wanted to go? Why did these other sites have more references of
the word 'Disney' than the genuine Walt Disney web site?" The
reason might be that these sites have "cyber stuffed" or "wall-
papered" their sites with code by simply repeating the word
"Disney" over and over thousands of times. Or, those sites may
3 Admittedly, "search engines" are technically distinct from "portals." I will
use the terms "search engines" and "portals" interchangeably.
4 The mechanics behind how a typical search engine chooses the web sites
that it does is much more complicated than explained here and is beyond the
scope of this article.
2000]
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have inserted in their site hidden "metatag" keywords with the
word "Disney."
Keyword tags are invisible to the human user but perceptible to
the search engine. As in this hypothetical, hidden words-such as
"Disney"-are intentionally inserted to intercept search engines
and the humans that use them to divert the user to a site she did not
intend to visit and did not expect. The hope is that once there, the
user will linger and see the advertising and content. Or, the hope is
at least to count the web surfer's visit as a "hit" to be touted to
potential advertisers.
Is this use of another's trademark an infringement? Is someone
or something being confused and deceived? It is apparent that the
tool used by the human searcher (i.e., the search engine) is being
intentionally confused and the human is confused into going
somewhere she does not want to go. No transaction, however, is
completed on-line while the user is confused because as soon as
the user arrives at the bogus site, it is obvious that this is not the
"real" Disney web site. Rather, the user was lured there under
false pretenses.
A variation on the theme of metatag misuse is for hypothetical
seller Nasty Co. to use its competitor Perfect Company's mark or
trade name in hidden code, thereby attempting to divert to Nasty's
web site potential customers who use a search engine to look for
the web site of the Perfect Co. Such a use would seem to be a clear
case of trademark infringement by direct palming off by Nasty Co.'
The type of confusion created by the use of misleading metatags
is not as great as if the accused used another's trademark as its
domain name. This is because the search engine presents the user
with a list of "hits" supposedly in order of relevance to the search
request. Display of this list still allows the web surfer to choose
among the hits listed.6 Nevertheless, a real potential for confusion
5 See Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp.2d 102
(D. Mass. 1998)(defendant was enjoined from using its web site in a manner
likely to lead users to believe that RMD was plaintiff Niton or affiliated with it
or that RMD's web site was Niton's web site).
6 As the Ninth Circuit noted, "in scanning [the] list, the Web user will often
be able to find the particular web site he is seeking." Brookfield
Communications, 174 F.3d at 1062.
234 [Vol. X:231
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exists. In fact, confusion was exactly what was intended in the
previous hypothetical scenarios.
In my trademark treatise, I proposed that in metatag cases the
courts should use the trademark law concept called "initial interest
confusion."7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently adopted
my suggestion in the Brookfield case and applied the initial interest
rule to a case involving metatags.8 The Brookfield decision,
however, was different from the previous hypothetical scenarios.
In Brookfleld, the metatag issue arose as a tag-along issue to a
domain name case which applied the traditional rules of trademark
law. The parties were disputing who had trademark rights in the
word "movie buff' for searchable on-line web sites about the
motion picture industry. The court found that the plaintiff had
established priority of use of the contested designation. In addition
to a preliminary injunction against the defendant's use of the
domain name "moviebuff.com," the plaintiff also received an
injunction against the defendant's use of "movie buff' in metatags
and buried code.
In a careful analysis of the metatag issue, the Ninth Circuit in
Brookfield agreed with my initial interest confusion proposal and
held that the use of a metatag which is confusingly similar to the
mark of a senior user is a form of infringement. The Court built on
the metaphor of a misleading sign on a freeway that I first
proposed in 1997.9 The Court gave this version of the metaphor:
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it
"Blockbuster") puts up a billboard on a highway
reading - "West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit
7 Infringement can be based upon confusion which creates initial customer
interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the
confusion. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 25.69 (4th ed. 2000 rev.).
8 Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d 1036.
9 A. Davis, "'Invisible' Trademarks on the Web Raise Novel Issue of
Infiingement," Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1997 (quoting J. Thomas McCarthy:
"Intercepting people on the information superhighway is like putting up a big




McCarthy: Trademarks, Cybersquatters and Domain Names
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART& ENT. LAW
7" - where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking
for West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and
drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West
Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the
highway entrance, they may simply rent there.'
This hypothetical nicely illustrates how the initial interest
confusion rule applies to attempts to lure web users to other sites.
Important to note is that the repetitious use of a generic,
non-trademark designation in hidden code, such as the repetition
thousands of times in a web site of the generic term "seed catalog,"
would not constitute trademark infringement. Such a practice,
however, tends to destroy the usefulness of a search engine.
B. Selling Key Words and Banner Advertising
Negating the traditional usefulness of a search engine that lists
hits in order of importance and relevance is the practice of some
search engines to "sell" or "auction" high placement on the list of
hits for certain key words. Many users believe that every search
engine lists the hits it finds in order of relative importance.
However, some search engines are now "selling" high placements
on the list of hits. In a hypothetical example, the imaginary law
finn of Dewey, Cheatum & Howe could "buy" from the
hypothetical "Rainbow" search engine the number one listing
whenever a web user typed in the search term "intellectual
property." One search engine even lists how much it costs to get
the top listing and, in auction fashion, offers the number one listing
to any subsequent higher bidder. A user can no longer trust the
objectivity of the rankings presented by such search engines.
10 Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1064. Accord. Interstellar
Starship Services, Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying
the initial interest rule to conflicting domain names).
236 [Vol. X:231
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A variation on this theme is the sale by search engines of banner
advertising on search results depending on the search words input
by the user. For example, assume, hypothetically, that the "Excite"
search engine sells to "Fragrance Counter," a discount perfume
distributor, banner ads that will appear on the search result every
time a user searches for perfume trademarks such as "Estee
Lauder." If the user then clicks on Fragrance Counter's animated
and prominent banner ad at the top of the search list, the user is
taken to the Fragrance Counter web site where another brand of
fragrance, such as Versace, is often prominently advertised as a
special deal.
Estee Lauder is challenging this activity in a lawsuit pending in
New York.1" Estee Lauder claims that Excite is selling to
Fragrance Counter the commercial magnetism and drawing power
of the Estee Lauder trademarks so that Fragrance Counter can use
that selling power to attract attention to itself, thereby assisting
Fragrance Counter to sell competing brands of fragrances. Is this
fair competition or a dirty trick? Is it a form of trademark dilution?
The court will tell us.
Meanwhile, in Los Angeles, Judge Alice Marie Stotler refused to
grant a preliminary injunction against the Excite and Netscape
portals' search engine from selling a list of 450 keywords,
including "playboy" and "playmate," to advertisers of sexually
explicit web sites.'2 The owners of the Playboy trademark claimed
that this was a form of trademark infringement because Excite was
selling the drawing power of the Playboy marks to competitors
who wanted banner ads for sexual material to appear on the search
result screen after someone typed in "playboy" or "playmate."
11 Estee Lauder Inc. v. Excite et al., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(procedural issue in which court declined to strike defendant's trademark misuse
defense.). See R.C. Scheinfield & P.H. Bagley, Using Others' Trademarks to
Trigger Internet Advertisements, New York Law Journal, March 24, 1999;
hIternet Ads Infi-inge Trademarks, Claims Estee Lauder, Managing Intellectual
Property, p.5 (March 1999).
12 Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 52
U.S.P.Q.2d 1162, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("The words 'playboy' and 'playmate'
are being used as words in the English language and not as trademarks to
identify a product or service. There should be no liability for that reason.").
2000] 237
7
McCarthy: Trademarks, Cybersquatters and Domain Names
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J ART & ENT. LAW
Judge Stotler said that this had nothing to do with those trademarks
because it was unknown whether the web user was using the words
"playboy" or "playmate" in their generic sense or in their
trademark sense.
In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that a teenage boy typing the
word "playboy" in a search engine does not intend to look for
information about the magazine, Playmate of the month and all of
the other products of Playboy Enterprises. Moreover, it is highly
probable that most teenage boys have never even heard of the
generic dictionary meaning of "playboy" as "a wealthy, carefree
man who devotes most of his time to leisure, self-amusement and
hedonistic pleasures, conventionally frequenting parties and night
clubs, romancing a rapid succession of attractive young women
and racing speedboats or sports cars."' 3
In cases such as Estee Lauder and Playboy, where keyword
placement of banner advertising is being sold, the portals and
search engines are certainly taking advantage of the drawing power
and goodwill of these famous marks. The question is whether this
activity is fair competition or whether it is a form of unfair
poaching on famous marks. Judge Stotler's Playboy decision is
certainly not the last word on this issue.
III. DOMAIN NAMES AS TRADEMARKS AND AS TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENTS
The current judicial battles over domain names are battles over a
commercially valuable "intuitive" domain name-a domain name
that clearly identifies the entity that owns the web site.'4 Currently,
13 RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1104 (1983 rev.).
14 Also valuable as "intuitive" domain names are generic words that
immediately tell the kind of goods or services available. However, this does not
create trademark issues. For example, in 1999, over $800,000 was paid for the
domain name "drugs.con" at an auction. See T. Harrigan, Internet 'Drugs.com'
Sold in Bidding War for More Than $800,000, Associated Press, August 7,
1999; San Francisco Chronicle, August 7, 1999. The auction was conducted by
238 [Vol. X:231
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no official directory of web sites or domain names exists. This
lack of a directory for domain names is the driving force behind all
the current trademark litigation regarding domain names. This,
however, may change. Network Solutions Inc. (hereinafter "NSI"),
the original exclusive registrar of the ".com" (hereinafter "dot-
com") top level domain, announced in the spring of 1999 that it
would introduce a "dot-coin directory" of domain names-similar
to a white pages telephone directory.
For example, assume a construction equipment maker has the
trade name "Triangle Incorporated." This company wants
<triangle.com> as its domain name, not some other designation
that would make it more difficult to find the site. In the United
States, all the commercial companies want a dot-corn domain
name, not some other generic top level domain and not a country
code top level domain. In the same way that businesses sometimes
desire to have a prestige business address, businesses also want a
prestige address in cyberspace-one that corresponds to the trade
name of the company or to a company trademark. Similar to a
street address or telephone number, all domain names serve the
purely technological function of locating a web site in cyberspace.
If Triangle Incorporated discovers that someone else, like the
"Triangle Ski Co.," a ski manufacturer in Colorado, has already
reserved with Network Solutions Inc. the domain name
<triangle.com>, what can the construction company do? It has no
grounds to object, since the ski company is just as entitled to
<triangle.com> as is the construction company. First come, first
reserved is the rule of the road in the domain name world. 5
A. How is a Domain Name "Reserved? "
A domain name is reserved or registered by a registrar or "NIC"
(Network Information Center, hereinafter NIC). A registrar
Greatdomains.com and dotbroker.com, which were also auctioning other names
such as "tobacco.con" and "videodating.com."
15 When the University of San Francisco wanted to reserve the domain name
"usf.edu" it found that the University of Southern Florida had already reserved
"usf.edu". So, the University of San Francisco had to settle for "usfca.edu."
239
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reserves either a territorial domain name or a global generic Top-
Level Domain name (hereinafter "TLD"), such as in the ".com,"
".net" and ".org" generic TLDs. Some other global TLDs are
".net," org, gov, and edu.'
Each nation has its own country code TLD indicator, denoted by
a two letter abbreviation. More than 240 national TLD indicators
exist. For example, the country code TLD indicator for the United
Kingdom is ".uk," for Canada the country code TLD is ".ca" and
the official web site of the British monarchy is
<www.royal.gov.uk>. As of April 2000, over 15 million domain
names had been reserved worldwide. 6 Of these, almost 12 million
are global TLDs and over 4 million are in country code TLDs. 7
These amounts are growing at over 500,000 names per month. 8 In
fact, some small nations have sought to promote their national top-
level domain names as attractive commercial sites. Such nations
include Turkmenistan's ".trn," and Tuvalu's ".tv.' ' 9
In the United States, NSI is a private corporation that, until early
1999, had a government-bestowed monopoly as registrar for
domain names. For several years, NSI was the only entity that
reserved the coveted dot-coin domain names. Currently, close to
ten million dot-coin domain names exist. NSI charged $70 per
domain name and reported 1998 revenues of $90 million dollars.
These numbers have given many people around the world the idea
that being a domain name registrar is almost like being given a
license to print money.
It is important to understand the distinction between trademark
rights which are enhanced through "registration" with a
government bureau or office, on the one hand, and Internet domain
names which are obtained from registrars-typically private




19 3. Fry, Hot New Country-Code Domain Comes with a Steep Price Tag,
Wall St. J., October 15, 1998 (The president of the company set up to register
names in Tuvalu's ".tv" domain for a $1000 deposit each was quoted as saying
of Tuvalu's 10,000 citizens: "The people of Tuvalu feel that this was literally a
gift from God .... They call it manna from heaven.").
240 [Vol. X:231
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explanatory adjective is an invitation to confusion and mistake.
That is why I prefer referring to domain names as being "reserved"
through a registrar, not "registered."
B. Domain Names and Trademark Law
1. Domain Names as Marks
The relationship between domain names and trademark law falls
into two parts: validity and infringement. The validity question is
whether a domain name is, or can become, a trade or service mark.
In other words, does a domain name serve as an Internet address
or is a domain name a protectable, and registrable trademark or
service mark? The correct answer is "yes." That answer requires
an explanation.
A domain name always has the technological job of designating
a location on the Internet. But it does not always have to do the
latter-act as a mark. The vast majority of domain names do not
perform the function of a trademark or service mark. For a
designation used as a domain name to achieve the legal status of a
mark, registered or unregistered, it must behave like a trademark.
Many web sites are essentially electronic magazines, offering
information about certain topics."
For a designation to act as a trademark or service mark under
United States trademark law, the designation must be used to
identify and distinguish a source of goods or services. Therefore,
the Patent and Trademark Office requires proof, via examples or
specimens of use, that the words making up the domain name are
being used not merely to identify a place or address on the Internet.
Rather, the words must be used as a trade or service mark to
20 Magazine titles, newspaper titles and titles of newspaper columns have
long been held to be protectable as trademarks or service marks. The fact that
the reader does not pay in cyberspace is not relevant to trademark status. J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION, §
10:6.1 (4th ed. 2000 rev.).
2000]
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identify the source of goods or services. A specimen consisting
merely of a business card or a corporate letterhead with telephone
numbers and a domain name will not be accepted as evidence of
use as a service mark.21
The traditional criteria are applied to determine whether the
designation has in fact been used as a mark: larger-sized print, all
capital letters or initial capitals, distinctive or different print style,
color and prominent position on label or advertising copy. The key
is whether the designation claimed as a protectable mark has been
used to make such a visual impression that the viewer would
perceive it as a symbol of origin separate and apart from anything
else.22 Only then does it perform the role of a mark to identify and
distinguish source.
2. Domain Names as Trademark Infringements
The other half of the domain name problem is whether a domain
name can infringe someone else's valid trademark or service mark.
Conflicts occur because registrars such as NSI do not, and
probably could not, search thousands of proposed domain names to
determine whether conflicts may arise with existing registered and
common law trademarks.23 Rather, registrars grant domain names
on a first-come, first-served basis. There are three possibilities by
21 Thus, the Trademark Board refused to register on the Supplemental
Register as a service mark for legal services the domain name
<www.eilberg.com>. The legal services were rendered by applicant William H.
Eilberg and the specimens consisted of use of
"EMAIL:WHE@EILBERG.COM" on business cards and letterheads along
with, and in the same size type as, telephone and fax numbers. The Board held
that this usage of the domain name did not function as a service mark to identify
and distinguish applicant's legal services because this use solely served to
indicate the location on the Internet where applicant's web site appeared. In re
Eilberg 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1955 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
22 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 3:3 (4th ed. 2000 rev.).
23 A court has held that NSI has no legal obligation to search and reject in
the first instances domain names that may infringe on the rights of others.
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal.
1997) aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
[Vol. X:231
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which a person or corporation can acquire the "triangle" domain
name. First is the possibility that a legitimate user of
<triangle.com>, such as the Triangle Ski Co., was the first to
reserve the domain name. Second, a "cyber-squatter" may have
noticed that no one yet had taken "triangle.com" and reserved it in
order to sell the nuisance rights to a prior user of the name. The
final possibility is that someone in England has reserved
<triangle.com.uk> even though an American entity has
<triangle.com>.
The Ninth Circuit has held that when comparing a trademark
with an accused domain name, the presence in the domain name of
the ".com" top-level domain indicator is of little importance to
distinguish the marks because it is so common and generic.24 The
Court found that the domain name <moviebuff.com> infringed
plaintiffs trademark "moviebuff." The Court also noted that if the
owners of both marks utilize the Internet as a marketing and
advertising tool, this heightens the likelihood of confusion.25
C. Gateway Pages
If a domain name dispute arises between two companies with
legitimate rights to a disputed mark, one should consider settling
the dispute by means of a "gateway page." For example, the
hypothetical "triangle" construction company and "triangle" ski
maker could agree to this approach. A gateway page, also known
as a "link page," or "directory" consists of a page listing companies
that share the same domain name. The availability of "gateway" or
"link pages" would lessen the demand for more top level domains
as a means of preventing the depletion of commercially useful
domain names. Since many concerns could share the same domain
name, there would be little likelihood of a paucity of marketable
names. Also, the use of "link pages" or "gateways" would bring
24 Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d 1036, 1055 (the court cited several
decisions finding that a domain name containing the ".com" gTLD indicator
infringed a mark that did not have that indicator).
25 Id. at 1057.
2000] 243
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domain name usage more in line with global trademark law which
permits several users in different territories or in different product
lines to use the same mark.
26
D. Trademark Disputes
In the "triangle.com" example, both the construction company
and ski company had some legitimate claim to the use of the word
"triangle" as a domain name. That conflict would be handled by
the traditional and normal rules of trademark priority and the
classic and venerable test of likelihood of confusion. These kinds
of cases are resolved by traditional trademark principles and
present no special kind of problem.27
The mere reservation of a designation as a domain name does
not create priority of use of that designation as a trademark. In the
Movie Buff case, the Ninth Circuit recognized that several courts
have held that reservation of a domain name does not itself
constitute "use" for purposes of being an infringer.28 The court
reasoned from this that therefore the reservation of a domain name
should not constitute "use" for purposes of creating rights by
establishing priority of ownership over another claimant.
If the respective uses of the marks are so widely separated by
product line or service category that confusion is unlikely,
infringement will not occur. For example, if a hypothetical start up
computer software company in Palo Alto using the "Janus"
trademark sued an amateur theater group in Chicago which
reserved the domain name <janus.com>, no infringement would
26 A page linking two different companies using the same domain name and
trademark can be seen at the web site <http://www.scrabble.com>. This page
presents the user with links to two different companies which share the board
game trademark "scrabble" in different nations of the world. The "scrabble"
mark is owned in the United States and Canada by Hasbro, Inc. and in the rest
of the world by a subsidiary of Mattel, Inc. Other gateway pages can be found
at <http://www.playtex.com> and <http://www.disc.com>.
27 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 25.76 (4th ed. 2000 rev.).
28 Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d 1036.
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occur because the goods and services are so different that there is
no likelihood of confusion. The software company is a start up, so
their mark is not "famous" and cannot be diluted.
E. Cybersquatting
General consensus is lacking as to what exactly constitutes a
"cybersquatter." The World Intellectual Property Organization has
one definition, the U.S. Congress another and the American courts
a third definition. Everyone seems to agree that such a cyber
squatter is Mr. Dennis Toeppen of Champaign, Illinois." Mr.
Toeppen had reserved with NSI about 240 domain names
consisting of a "who's who" of American trademarks. For
example, Mr. Toeppen had reserved domain names
<deltaairlines.com>, <crateandbarrel.com> and <ussteel.com>.
Mr. Toeppen's business was to give up his rights to these domain
names for the payment of money by the identified company. Since
Mr. Toeppen was willing to defend his business practice in court
(unlike the vast majority of cybersquatters), he has made a good
deal of the case law regarding domain names and trademark
infringement.
In my view, there was a poor fit between the actions of the
typical cybersquatter and the federal trademark law as it existed
prior to November, 1999. This includes the Anti-Dilution Act. The
usual cybersquatter has no interest in using the domain name to
identify a website. The cybersquatter typically wants only to
warehouse the name and deprive the legitimate owner of its use,
releasing it only for a fee. Thus, the prototypical cybersquatter does
not use the reserved domain name as a trademark before the public.
Because the public usually never is exposed to the cybersquatter's
domain name, the required element of likely consumer confusion is
missing.
29 Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Toeppen
is what is commonly referred to as a cyber-squatter .... These individuals
attempt to profit from the Internet by reserving and later reselling or licensing
domain names back to the companies that spent millions of dollars developing
the goodwill of the trademark.").
2000]
15
McCarthy: Trademarks, Cybersquatters and Domain Names
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART & ENT. LAW
For all types of trademark infringement and false advertising,
except for dilution, the Lanham Act requires that the accused use
be "in connection with" goods or services so as to be likely to
cause confusion.3 °  The hoarding cybersquatter who merely
reserves a domain name and does nothing more fails to fit this
statutory requirement. Therefore, courts have held that the act of
reserving a domain name, without more, does not itself bring a
party within the traditional language of the Lanham Act-
regardless how lacking the cybersquatter's claim to the domain
name may be.3
If a domain name is not used publicly by the cybersquatter, it
cannot cause dilution in the public mind by blurring or
tarnishment. The new Federal Anti-Dilution Act, as used to solve
several domain name cases (such as cases against Toeppen),
requires that the accused user make a "commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name."32 "Commercial use" implies
a setting where some goods or services are bought, sold or
advertised for sale or given away. This is not what the typical
cybersquatter does. Rather, he hoards or warehouses dozens or
hundreds of domain names for eventual sale to the rightful owners.
Thus, the courts have had to create an entire new category of
"dilution" in order to find a legal weapon to combat this new and
different form of reprehensible commercial activity. But dilution
only protects "famous" marks, requiring the courts to expand and
devalue the category of "famous" marks in order to combat
cybersquatting. What was needed was a legal tool which is
specific to the conduct of the typical cybersquatter.
30 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (infringement of registered marks); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(A) (1996) (infringement of unregistered marks); 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(B) (1996) (false advertising).
31 Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996),
afftd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Registration of a trademark as a domain
name, without more, is not a commercial use of the trademark and is therefore
not within the prohibitions of [§43(c) of] the [Lanham] Act."); Juno Online
Services v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (agreeing that
"the mere reservation of a right in the domain name ... is not enough to
constitute 'use' as defendant has merely reserved the right to use the mark").
32 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).
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The courts stretched the Federal Anti-Dilution Act like a rubber
band to reach cybersquatters. But where is the statutorily required
"commercial use" by the cybersquatter? In one of Toeppen's cases,
Toeppen reserved with NSI the two domain names
<panavision.com> and <panaflex.com> both of which were
registered trademarks of plaintiff Panavision International, a maker
of motion picture, television camera and photographic equipment.33
Toeppen said he wanted $13,000 from Panavision for the domain
names. Panavision, refusing to pay this "ransom," sued Toeppen
in federal court in Los Angeles. Judge Pregerson granted
Panavision summary judgment under the 1996 Federal Anti-
Dilution Act. But where was Toeppen's "commercial use" of the
domain names?
The Court accepted the argument that Toeppen did utilize the
designation Panavision in a "commercial use" because Toeppen's
"business" was to reserve famous trademarks as domain names and
then ransom the domain names to the true trademark owners.34
Dilution was found by foreclosure. That is, Toeppen prevented
Panavision from using its own name as a ".com" domain name on
its own authorized Internet page.35 Judge Pregerson was careful to
limit his decision to one who reserves another's famous trademark
33 Panavision, 945 F. Supp. 1296, affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
34 "Toeppen's 'business' is to register trademarks as domain names and then
to sell the domain names to the trademark owners . . . . His 'business' is
premised on the desire of the companies to use their trademarks as domain
names and the calculation that it will be cheaper to pay him than to sue him.
Panavision, however, chose to litigate rather than to accede to Toeppen's
$13,000 'fee."' Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303.
35 "The court finds that Toeppen's conduct, which prevented Panavision
from using its marks in a new and important business medium, has diluted
Panavision's marks within the meaning of the [federal] statute." Panavision,
945 F. Supp. at 1304. Similarly, in affirming, the Ninth Circuit said that
potential customers of Panavision "will be discouraged" if they cannot find the
web page at "panavision.com" and that this "dilutes the value of Panavision's
trademark." Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327. Undoubtedly, the court stretched
the law to reach the reprehensible actions of a cybersquatter. The Ninth Circuit
admitted that it was creating a new category of dilution which was shaped to fit
cybersquatting: "Toeppen's conduct varied from the two standard dilution
theories of blurring and tarnishment." Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326.
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as a domain name for the purpose of trading on the value of the
mark by selling the domain name to the trademark owner.36
Certainly these decisions against Toeppen have stretched the law
of the Anti-Dilution statute regarding what constitutes commercial
use for a mark. This seems appropriate so long as the precedent is
limited to the cybersquatter factual situation. However, in Avery-
Dennison,37 Judge Letts stretched the "cybersquatter" category to
include the defendant Mailbank, a company that reserved over
12,000 ".net" domain names. Mailbank reserved surname domain
names such as "ford.net," "strauss.net" and "mcdonald.net" in
order to license them to people with that personal name to use as
vanity e-mail addresses. Mailbank's "avery.net" and
"dennison.net" were held to be diluting and Judge Letts granted
Avery Dennison summary judgment.
The Ninth Circuit did not approve of the dismissal on summary
judgment, reversed and ordered Judge Letts to grant summary
judgment for the defendant Mailbank 8 The Court said that the
Mailbank company was not a cybersquatter merely because it was
in the business of stockpiling domain names. Unlike the typical
cybersquatter, Mailbank was seeking to profit from the surname
value of words like "Avery" and "Dennison," not from their
trademark meaning. The Court said "commercial use under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires the defendant to be using
the trademark as a trademark, capitalizing on its trademark
status."39 In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that to be "famous," a
mark has to meet very stringent standards and be truly prominent
36 Panavision, 945 F. Supp. 1296, affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998)
(dictum that a citizen who uses an allegedly infringing domain name on a web
site that only provides a community forum to discuss local political issues
"would come under the ['43(c) statutory] exemption for noncommercial use").
37 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998),
rev'd, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
38 Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
39 Id. at 880 ("[The Mailbank defendants] do not use trademarks qua
trademarks as required by the caselaw to establish commercial use. Rather
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and renowned.40 Since the Court held that the evidence did not
prove that the "Avery" and "Dennison" marks qualified as being
individually "famous," Avery-Dennison could not invoke the very
special protection offered by the anti-dilution law.
F. The 1999 Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
As previously mentioned, traditional federal trademark law,
including the Anti-Dilution Act, did not offer adequate redress
against the actions of the typical cybersquatter. Congress
recognized this and on November 29, 1999 enacted "The Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act" (ACPA). 41 This was
directed at preventing cybersquatting on the Internet by registering
domain names similar to trademarks and person's names. The
trademark related portions of the Act outlawed the act of
registering, with the bad faith intent to profit, a domain name that
is confusingly similar to a registered or unregistered mark or
dilutive of a famous mark. The in rem jurisdictional authorization
of the Act permits court disposition of a domain name when the
owner cannot be found or cannot be served in the United States.
Also part of the Act were special protections against the
cybersquatting of a person's non-trademarked name, which were
not included as a part of the Lanham Act. In addition, the 1999
Act immunized a domain name registrar from monetary and
injunctive relief for most actions in the implementation of a
40 Id. at 874 ("Dilution is a cause of action invented and reserved for a select
class of marks-those marks with such powerful consumer associations that
even non-competing uses can impinge on their value."). The Ninth Circuit in
Avery Dennison and the First Circuit in the 1998 Kohler case both agreed with
the author that to qualify as "famous," a mark must be "truly prominent and
renowned." J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION, §24:91 (4th ed. 2000 rev.). See I.P. Lund Trading ApS. v.
Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting McCarthy treatise).
41 The Act was Title III ("Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act") of
a very long and large omnibus appropriations Act known as the Intellectual
Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999", PL 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501 (enacted November 29, 1999).
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reasonable policy of the registrar prohibiting the registration of an
infringing domain name.
Congress added a new Lanham Act section 43(d), which is
aimed at stopping the conduct of cybersquatters or cyberpirates.42
In the first appellate decision under the Cyberpiracy Act, the
Second Circuit found a violation where a competitor reserved and
used the domain name <sportys.com> with a bad faith intent to
profit by preventing the senior user "Sporty's" catalog business
from getting that domain name. The junior user's later attempt to
legitimatize the use by creating a subsidiary called "Sporty's
Farm" that sold Christmas trees at the web site was found to be a
transparent sham.43
G. The 2000 Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure for Domain
Name Disputes
In 2000, a second legal tool specifically directed at
cybersquatters became available to trademark owners. As of
January, 2000, all global top level registrars (including NSI) had
adopted the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (UDRP). That is, the ICANN policy applies to all accredited
registrars in the three major gTLD domains: the .com, .net and .org
top-level domains. The Policy is supported by detailed procedural
rules."
All those who reserve a domain name in the .com, .net and .org
top level domains must agree to abide by this dispute resolution
policy, which permits the owner of a mark to initiate an
administrative complaint against an alleged cybersquatter. The test
of similarity is likelihood of confusion and proof of the "bad faith"
of the domain name holder is required."a Defenses include proof
42 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 25:78 (4th ed. 2000 rev).
43 Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir.
2000).
44 The "Policy" and "Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy" are found at <http://www.icann.org>.
45 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 25:74.2 (4th ed. 2000 rev.).
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that the challenged domain name embodies prior trademark rights
or the holder's recognized name and the defense of noncommercial
use or fair use. The complaint is quickly decided by a panel of one
or three decision makers who render a written and published
decision as to ownership of the disputed domain name.
Independent judicial review is available.
It is not clear what weight a court would give to the decision of a
dispute resolution panel. While the domain name registrant is
contractually bound "to submit to a mandatory administrative
proceeding" the ICANN policy (and the agreement between
registrant and gTLD registrar) does not require the registrant to
agree to not challenge a panel decision or to treat it as if it were an
arbitration award. In fact the ICANN UDRP explicitly states in
'4(k) that the mandatory administrative proceedings requirement
does not prevent either the registrant or the challenger from
submitting the dispute to a court for "independent resolution"
before or after the administrative proceeding. "Independent
resolution" implies that an ICANN panel decision does not have
the weight of an arbitration award and will not be given the judicial
deference usually accorded an arbitral tribunal. There appears to
be nothing in the ICANN policy or in the registrant-registrar
contract that would prevent a court after the panel decision from
determining the dispute de novo and adjudging it according to the
substantive rules of trademark law invoked in court by the party
displeased with the panel decision. However, in the author's
opinion, a reviewing court should give some degree of respect and
consideration to a panel decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Striving to resolve trademark issues in cyberspace has been
compared to attempting to board a moving bus. The factual
settings and Internet technology change almost daily and the law
struggles to keep up. For an attorney faced with difficult questions
from a client, it is frightening, challenging and exciting. And these
developments are just the beginning. I believe we are witnessing
the creation of a whole new mode of global communications and
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marketing. Perhaps we are victims (or beneficiaries) of that
ancient Chinese curse: "May you live in interesting times."
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